Wednesday, July 6, 2011

Pakistan Army in National Politics

DAWN
21 July 2001 Saturday 28 Rabi-us-Sani 1422

Familiar pattern of military rule

By S. Akhtar Rai

The act of self-elevation by the chief executive to the office of president brings the wheel of the country's return to military rule to full circle. While the pattern and method of the latest move are familiar in so far as it follows the well-established script, its implications because of the peculiar conditions of the state and society and accumulative effect of long military rule are quite serious.

Pakistan may appear to be an isolated case in the contemporary world but it has many parallells in history where state as an institution fell under complete hegemony of its armed forces, where legislature, executive, judiciary, civil society, media, clergy, economic and political forces all progressively failed to articulate the elan vital of the state, and assert its existence as a collective institution.

The country seems to have reached a point in history as in Bismarck's Prussia, and the Janissaries' Ottoman Empire where the army assumes hegemonic control over the state and society whose creation it is supposed to be. This inversion of relationship between the creator and the creature leads to paradigms of malfunction, dysfunction, and eventual breakdown. The military comes to foist itself on all the institutions of the state and society and virtually declares itself the state.

It can be argued that today's Pakistan is not a state that has an army. It is, in fact, an army within which a state seems to exist. The compliance with which the latest travesty of law, morality and politics has been received in the country speaks volumes about the helplessness of the people and society in general.

Over the last few decades the military has steadily grown into the only factor to reckon with. It swallows up all radiance and drains energy from every component of the state and society, be it politics, economy, religion, media, academia, or bureaucracy. The process is ongoing and escalating with no signs of abatement. Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary the military leadership has convinced itself that they are the saviours of this country and the only viable force that can keep the country united.

They have nurtured a belief that the state and civil society are incapable of maintaining and defending themselves against internal and external threats. Hence it falls upon the armed forces to defend the geographical as well as ideological frontiers of the country. This Messianic complex betrays a deeper tension in the collective psyche of the military leadership of Pakistan that needs to be discussed separately.

From the so-called Rawalpindi conspiracy case of 1951 there has developed a tradition among the military officers to blame politicians for all the ills, particularly military setbacks, and assume that they themselves were the best to put things right. Liaquat Ali Khan, assassinated by the police and intelligence, was blamed for letting the military down in Kashmir by agreeing to a cease-fire when Srinagar was about to fall to the advancing irregulars of Pakistan.

Truth of the matter is that had Liaquat Ali Khan not agreed to the cease-fire (as the military rulers did not agree in 1971) in the face of advancing Indian troops there would have been no Azad Kashmir today. Similar views were disseminated about the 1965 war. The refrain was that Ayub Khan had turned a great victory into a defeat by agreeing to cease-fire and then signing the Tashkent declaration.

From Ayub to Musharraf there is a familiar pattern of military take-over and its perpetuation. At the time of every take-over the country is supposed to be on the brink of the precipice, its very existence in danger, its economy ruined and the corrupt politicians seen bleeding the country white. Before the country could break apart, the armed forces live up to the challenge and very reluctantly depose political leadership and assume administrative control of the country temporarily.

The take-over is presumed to have been always forced upon the military leadership who, we are supposed to believe, had no political ambitions or axe to grind and are, in fact, keen to go back to the barracks. In practice this only meant that they wanted a free hand so that they could quickly fix the problems and then hand over power to a better political leadership nurtured in a manner they desired.

Regarding return to the barracks, it took Ayub Khan ten years, Ziaul Haq eleven years without producing any of the professed results. Yahya Khan had to leave early because he made the colossal 'mistake' of holding free and fair election that left him little room to manoeuvre; since then no military ruler has repeated this 'mistake'.

In the political vacuum created by each military regime and in the absence of any meaningful opposition it was inevitable that the coup leader would continue to secure and strengthen his position to be able "to serve the supreme national interests". Musharraf said on his self-appointment as president that it was the most difficult decision of his life "and, I bow my head in total humility for the bounties bestowed by the Almighty upon me... I feel in all humility that if I have a role to play for this nation I will not hesitate whatever decisions are involved. I hold national interests supreme... I think I have a role to play, I have a job to do here, I cannot and will not let this nation down..."

Having been imbued with a sense of destiny the first and foremost task has always been to eliminate political forces particularly the erstwhile ruling party to pave the way for 'true democracy'. That's how every military regime has held non-party elections at the local bodies level and refused to hold election at the national and provincial levels. Ayub Khan firmly believed that parliamentary democracy was not suitable for Pakistan therefore he had to make do with 'basic democracy' only. Ziaul Haq waited for eleven years to obtain 'positive results' and never held general elections as promised but did arrange local bodies election.

It's ironic that the people who are fit to rule and govern themselves at the local level are deemed unfit and unreliable to manage the affairs of the state. Both Ayub and Zia lived in mortal fear of the resurrection of 'the discredited political leadership' through a free general election. Unfortunately for them the very political forces they tried to destroy throughout their reign triumphed at the end, though only temporarily. But each resurrection proved the bankruptcy of controlled democracy, and the vitality and strength of parliamentary democracy. The present regime is following the same course and that the result may not be much different.

Hence, to avert it the only hope lies in an 'intellectual insurgency'. Like the proton and antiproton that escape from the gravitational attraction of the black hole and drain energy from it the intellectuals of Pakistan need to start a 'peaceful insurgency'. They may constitute a "conscience commission" to investigate 'crimes against the nation' committed by our rulers. We need to remind and remember that Pakistan came into being through a political struggle led by a barrister and not through an armed struggle as in case of Turkey and some other countries. Pakistan is not a Middle Eastern country where authoritarian tradition and military rule has a measure of historical legitimacy.

Pakistan is part of the South Asia where cultural-ethnic-religious pluralism, 'punchayat', and 'jirga' have always gnawed at authoritarian ego. The noise and chaos of the 'chowk', the bazaar, the 'autaak and the 'hujra' are more representative of Pakistan than the calm and quiet of the cantonment.